




ver the past 10 years, global inflation has dropped from 30 percent
to 4 percent.1 Without question, a large part of this breathtaking
drop in inflation has to be attributed to improved central bank
institutions and practice: enhanced central bank independence, a greater
prevalence of more conservative anti-inflation oriented central bankers,
better communications strategies, and improved monetary control capabili-
ties. Also, the greater awareness in central bank boards, and among
politicians and the public that higher inflation is the wrong instrument to
deal with deep-seated structural and fiscal problems has no doubt encour-
aged central bank efforts. Yes, central banks rightly deserve a lot of credit for
today’s low inflation rates, but do they deserve it all? Have tailwinds made
the political economy of disinflation in the last decade or two easier than
commonly recognized? Will factors that for a while may have been excep-
tionally supportive of anti-inflation efforts be reversed? Improved fiscal
policy and the technology revolution are examples of such factors which are
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popular in many explanations of the recent disinflation trends. I focus,
instead, on the increased level of competition—in both product and labor
markets—that has resulted from the interplay of increased globalization,
deregulation, and a decreased role for governments in many economies. 
Obviously, since competition tends to drive down prices, such an
interplay should have some direct impact on inflation. However, I argue
here that the major influence of competition on prices works through
the political economy process that governs long-term inflation trends.
Competition not only tends to reduce the overall level of prices, but it
also tends to make prices (and wages) more flexible. As a consequence,
the real effects of unanticipated monetary policy become smaller and
more transitory. Hence, there is less cause for central banks to inflate
and less incentive for politicians to pressure them to do so. Perhaps no
less important, output and employment tend to be higher in an
economy with greater competition. This, too, undermines potential
pressures on the central bank to inflate. The net effect of these reduced
pressures is that the central bank’s anti-inflation credibility is enhanced,
and trend inflation falls. 
In what follows, the discussion is mostly nontechnical. Toward the
end of the paper though, I sharpen my central point with a small mathe-
matical model. Technically adept but impatient readers may wish to turn
immediately to section II. By no means is this the only model of how
globalization may affect trend inflation. Dollarization, for example, in
many emerging markets, forces inflation-prone governments to temper
their behavior for fear of having residents flee to other currencies. Regard-
less, the remarkable breadth of disinflation’s shadow and the sweeping
range of countries it has touched strongly suggest that there must be
deeper political economy causes at work than are commonly recognized.
Whatever the explanation of global disinflation, the raw data are
stunning. In recent years, inflation around the world has dropped to
levels that only two decades ago seemed frustratingly unattainable. If
one takes into account technical biases in the construction of the CPI,
as well as central banks’ desire to maintain a small amount of padding
to facilitate relative price adjustment and avoid deflation then, disinfla-
tion has already run its full course in most industrialized countries. In
the developing world, if current trends persist—with the emphasis onECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 47
“if”—inflation will be tamed within a decade. Can the current situation
be regarded as stable into the indefinite future? Has the inflation process
changed fundamentally?
The story in the advanced countries is well recorded: Inflation aver-
aged 9 percent in the first half of the 1980s, versus 2 percent since the
beginning of this decade. Far less well known is the remarkable perfor-
mance of the developing countries, with inflation falling from an average
of 31 percent in 1980-84 to an average of under 6 percent in 2000-03.
Early in the 1990s, from 1990 to 1994, average inflation exceeded 230
percent in Latin America and 360 percent in the transition economies,
while it hovered around 40 percent in Africa. Average inflation in all
three regions is projected to approach single digits in 2003.
Along with the aggregate decline in inflation, outlier cases have vir-
tually disappeared as well. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, episodes of
very high inflation and hyperinflation abounded, especially in Latin
America, Africa, and the transition economies. Argentina’s price level
has increased a 100 trillion times since 1970, Brazil’s a quadrillion
(thousand trillion), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 10
quadrillion.2 Today, only three of the 184 IMF members—Myanmar
(40 percent), Angola (over 75 percent) and Zimbabwe (over 400
percent)—are expected to reach or pass the 40 percent mark, the
threshold above which most researchers find inflation acutely damag-
ing.3 Only 11 countries are projected to have inflation over 20 percent
in 2003, and only six over 30 percent. Inflation at these levels is still
problematic but a far cry from the problems of a decade ago.
The first section of the paper documents the broad global trend
toward lower inflation and asks whether the time series properties of
inflation have changed. In theory, inflation should be more stable at
lower levels; but do the data in fact show it to be better anchored? The
evidence in favor of this view for industrialized countries is mixed, and
more so for emerging markets.
The second section takes a look at the forces that may have been
driving the disinflation process. With little controversy that improved
central bank design has been a major factor behind improved inflation
performance, I make no attempt here to examine in depth the workings
of its different components (greater independence, better communica-
tion strategies, improved techniques, etc.) Instead, I focus on whether48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
other factors, such as more prudent fiscal policies, higher productivity
growth, deregulation, and increased globalization may have also con-
tributed to make disinflation both less painful and more successful.
The paper first turns to fiscal policy. Since the invention of money,
pressure to finance government debt and deficits, directly or indirectly,
has been the single most important driver of inflation. It is not at all
clear, however, that improved fiscal policy has been the main driver of
the recent disinflation. True, the data suggest that primary surpluses have
risen (or deficits fallen) sharply in both Latin America and in Africa. But
in other regions, the trends are more ambiguous. In the industrialized
countries, primary surpluses had increased until the recent downturn;
but if one takes account of the long-term fiscal implications of deterio-
rating demographic profiles, the picture is at best mixed. Elsewhere, in
many emerging-market and developing economies the public debt has
increased sharply relative to income over the past 15 years.4
The next section of the paper examines briefly global productivity
trends, another factor that is sometimes cited as having contributed to
disinflation. While the productivity story neatly fits the U.S. experience
of the second half of the 1990s, its generalization to other regions, for
example, Europe, is far from obvious. 
I then turn to discussing the political economy model of globaliza-
tion, competition, and inflation alluded to in the opening paragraph of
the introduction, including a small analytical model. The concluding
part of the paper briefly speculates on the how likely it is that inflation
might return in the foreseeable future, despite recent improvement in
central bank design and function. 
I. THE NEAR UNIVERSAL FALL IN INFLATION
We now turn to look more closely at the global taming of inflation
over the past decade—two decades for most industrial countries. Dif-
ferent countries, facing significantly different institutional, political,
and historical circumstances, have taken diverse routes to achieving
lower inflation. The vast majority have succeeded, and dramatically so.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 49
Global inflation trends
Table 1 reviews the 25-year period from 1980 to 2004, providing
(purchasing power parity) GDP-weighted average inflation rates by
major groupings of countries. Global inflation averaged 15 percent in
the 1980s, with Latin America having far and away the highest inflation
rates, rising from 82 percent in the first half of the decade to 186
percent by the latter part of the 1980s. Global inflation peaked at 30
percent in the first half of the 1990s, thanks to soaring inflation
throughout the developing world, and especially in the newly formed
transition countries. Even developing Asia, with its generally far more
stable macroeconomic policies, had inflation going into double digits.
Since one or two very high or hyperinflation countries may bias the
regional averages, it is helpful to break down the data by country. We
proceed to do this in two ways. Table 2 lists all countries that kept infla-
tion below zero or above 10 percent in 1992 or are projected to for
2003. Countries with inflation rates between 0 and 10 are omitted
from this table, but all countries’ inflation performance is given in detail
in the Appendix table for the years 1970-2003. In 1992, 44 countries
had inflation over 40 percent. While the transition countries accounted
for just over half the total, the high-inflation group had representatives




1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 2000-04  2003
World 14.1 15.5 30.4 8.4 4.1 3.9 3.9
Industrial economies 8.7 3.9 3.8 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.9
Developing countries 31.4 48.0 53.2 13.1 5.7 5.6 6.0
Africa 16.8 17.9 39.8 20.6 11.8 11.0 10.7
Asia 9.0 11.5 10.5 7.3 2.3 2.4 2.6
Latin America 82.4 185.9 232.6 17.2 8.2 7.9 10.9
Middle East 18.6 22.5 30.4 29.6 16.4 15.3 13.4
Transition economies 6.2 7.7 363.2 53.9 14.5 13.4 10.0
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Chart 1
INCIDENCE OF DEFLATION AND LOW INFLATION
Source: Data derived from Kumar and others (2003)
*Number of country months with year-on-year inflation less than 1 percent or negative, as a percent
of total. Data are based on 35 of the largest industrial and emerging market economies.
All countries Industrial countries Emerging market countries
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Chart 2a
DISTRIBUTION OF CPI INFLATION
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook
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Chart 2b
DISTRIBUTION OF CPI INFLATION
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already noted, only Myanmar, Angola, and Zimbabwe are projected to
have inflation over 40 percent, down from six countries in 2002.6
If anything, deflation threatens more countries today than does
very high inflation (over 40 percent). Taking into account the well-
known upward bias of the CPI (due, for example, to new goods and
new retail outlets), and delineating deflation at .5 percent or 1 percent,
deflation becomes a very large category (See Chart 1).7
Charts 2a-2b give a broader time series perspective on individual
country inflation by developing country region since 1980. The thick,
dark line in each of the charts gives the of countries, for the correspon-
ding point in time, with inflation between 0 and 10. In Latin America,
the of low to very low inflation countries has risen from under 10
percent in 1980 to almost 80 percent in 2003. In the Middle East, only
a third of countries had low to very low inflation in 1980, but today the
share is again over 80 percent. In developing Asia, the rise is from under
20 percent to 70 percent (not including countries with deflation.) The
pattern is reversed for very high inflation. 
Persistence
Virtually any plausible political economy theory of the inflation
process suggests that low inflation ought to be a more stable state than
high inflation. Several cross-country empirical studies support this
hypothesis. For instance, Ragan (1994) showed a clear positive relation-
ship between the rate of inflation and its standard deviation for 22
OECD countries over the period 1960-1989, confirming evidence
which had accumulated since the early studies by Okun (1971) and
Logue and Willett (1976). More refined measures of inflation volatility,
and extension of the analysis to emerging-market countries, yield
similar results.8
In augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, using monthly data for the period
from 1960 to 2003, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root
(loosely speaking, a random walk component) in inflation for any of the
G-7 countries. The picture is slightly more mixed for smaller industrial
countries. Inflation in Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, and
Portugal appears to be better characterized by a stationary process. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 55
However, in the case of the G-7 economies, as Table 3 indicates,
splitting the sample in the early 1980s, we obtain a more nuanced and
more interesting picture. For all countries except Japan, we fail to reject
the unit root hypothesis in the early period of the sample. In contrast,
we can reject this hypothesis for all the G-7 countries without exception
for the 1981-2003 period, and at a fairly high level of significance.
These results, while admittedly sensitive to the choice of breakpoint, are
broadly consistent with the view that during the 1970s inflation was
adrift; whereas in recent years, expectations have become better
anchored. When there is a shock to inflation, markets now expect that
it will eventually dampen out. That view is also corroborated by survey
data and expectations derived from inflation-indexed bonds. These
suggest that inflation in many industrialized countries has become more
firmly anchored in recent years and less sensitive to fluctuations in
short-term inflation movements.9
For most developing countries and emerging markets, the time
period over which inflation has been stable is a relatively short one, as is
clear enough from Charts 2a and 2b. For the small number of develop-
ing countries for which a moderately long stable-inflation period is
Table 3
P-VALUES OF UNIT ROOT TESTS FOR G-7 COUNTRIES
Sample Period/Country 1960.1–1981.12 1982.1–2003.4






United Kingdom .2656 .0176
Note: Author’s calculations are based on monthly CPI data (national sources), using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis is of a unit root in the inflation process, with the p-values indi-
cating the probability level at which the null hypothesis can be rejected. Thus in the first period, the
hypothesis is not rejected at 10 percent level or better for any country except Japan (for which it is
rejected at 0.06 percent); for the second period it is rejected for all countries at 10 percent level or bet-
ter, indicating that in this period the inflation process did not have a unit root.56 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 3
CPI INFLATION, 1930-2003
Source: Global Financial Data, Inc.; and IMF, World Economic Outlook
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available, it is possible to test for increased stability in a manner analo-
gous to our approach for industrialized countries. For emerging-market
countries such as Chile, Israel, and South Africa, the results support the
view that inflation over the recent period is mean-reverting; if inflation
spikes, agents should expect the effects to fade away.
Of course, one cannot read too much into tests based on a relatively
limited time period—even a few decades—given the historical evidence
that inflation cycles tend to run in very long waves (Chart 3).
II. FACTORS UNDERPINNING THE GLOBAL
REDUCTION IN INFLATION
One view of the past 50 years is that the monetary authorities just
got bamboozled by bad Keynesian theories in the 1960s and 1970s.
The great inflation of the 1970s and 1980s was the byproduct of
macroeconomic teaching malpractice. Once the world’s central bankers
started coming to their senses in the 1980s, ending inflation was just a
matter of communication and technique.10 Perhaps; but this interpreta-
tion probably gives too little credit to previous generations of
policymakers and too much credit to modern day monetary authorities,
not to mention 1980s monetary theory.11 Academic economists, for
example, remain widely divided on the magnitude of the costs of infla-
tion once below, say, 10 percent. Are we really so sure that 2 percent is
dramatically better than 3 percent or 4 percent? How did Japan become
mired in deflation for the last five years if we have it all figured out? I
fully agree that improved institutions and more sophisticated policy-
makers—not to mention a more sophisticated public—have played
pivotal roles. Still, the fact that inflation has fallen everywhere—even in
countries with weak institutions, unstable political systems, thinly-
staffed central banks, etc.—invites us to open our minds to the
possibility that other factors have also been significant. But I begin by
showing that central bank independence does indeed seem to have been
on the rise throughout the world; there is a solid core of truth to the
conventional wisdom.58 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Greater central bank independence
A number of academic studies attempt to measure central bank
independence (see, for example, Berger, Eijffinger, and de Haan (2001)
for a survey), though most aim at comparing independence across coun-
tries rather than across time. One widely used statistic, key to many
indices, is the rate of central bank head turnover.12 Table 4 shows the
turnover index by region for the subperiods 1970-89, and 1990-99.13 In
developing countries the turnover rate dropped sharply from the first
subperiod to the second, signifying greater independence. Latin America
and the Middle East recorded particularly marked improvements.14 In
the industrial countries, there is little change in this independence
measure over the two sub-periods. However, a plethora of other infor-
mation—for example, the granting of legal independence to the Bank of
England and the Bank of Japan, not to mention the creation of the
ECB—suggests that even for these countries, institutional change has
been deep and widespread.
It is more difficult to quantify other trend changes in central banks. I
would argue that there has been a shift in emphasis toward appointing
central bankers with greater inflation focus and awareness, and arguably
greater technical skills. Others believe that good performance requires very
specific mixes of policies—for example, that certain narrow interpretations
Table 4
AVERAGE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR 
TURNOVER RATE
(Fraction per five years)
Region 1970–89 1990–2002




Latin America .404 .317
Middle East .194 .072
Transition economies .200 .316
Source: Ghosh, Gulde, and Holder 2002 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 59
of inflation targeting work much better than other policies. Skeptics,
however, can point to the fact that many different approaches appear to
have worked.15 One way to illustrate how the recent global disinflation has
transcended narrow interpretations of monetary regimes is to look at infla-
tion performance across different exchange rate regimes. 
Chart 4 sorts countries’ exchange rates regimes into five groupings
according to the “Natural Classification Scheme” of Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004). Loosely speaking, the Natural Classification scheme
sorts countries’ exchange rate regimes according to statistical measures
of exchange rate movements, rather than according to the government’s
officially declared policies. Chart 4 is based on the “coarse” version of
the Natural Classification, which groups countries in increasing order of
flexibility as pegs, limited flexibility, managed floats, freely floating, and
freely falling (the last category essentially includes countries with infla-
tion over 40 percent or countries that have recently experienced an
exchange rate crisis). As one can see, limited flexibility and freely float-
ing currencies have the best inflation performance, but the gap is fairly
narrow over the various categories except, of course, for freely falling.
Chart 4
AVERAGE ANNUAL INFLATION ACROSS EXCHANGE
RATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR 138 COUNTRIES, 1950-2002
Note: CPI inflation is from IMF, World Economic Outlook; and exchange rate regime is according to
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Disaggregating by major economic or regional grouping of coun-
tries, as illustrated in Chart 5, yields a similar conclusion.16 Since the
Natural Classification closely mirrors the monetary regime (most of the
freely floating and managed floating countries look closely at domestic
inflation in determining monetary policy), the fact that the exchange
rate regime does not terribly impinge on inflation performance sup-
ports the view that there has been no “one-size-fits-all” approach to
achieving and maintaining inflation.
Tighter fiscal policy
Many countries improved their fiscal positions during the 1990s,
not only within the group of industrial economies but also in Africa
and Latin America. As Table 5 indicates, industrial countries averaged
general government primary balances of 2.8 percent during the period
1990-2002 compared to -0.1 percent for 1970-89. The picture is even
better if one excludes the last two to three years, when activity was
Chart 5
AVERAGE ANNUAL INFLATION BY EXCHANGE RATE
REGIME ARRANGEMENT AND REGION, 1991-2001
Note: CPI inflation is from IMF, World Economic Outlook; and exchange rate regime is according to
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subpar in most industrialized countries (though, as already noted, if one
incorporates the creeping costs of the demographic time bomb, the
picture is less cheery). Emerging markets and developing countries have
similarly succeeded in raising conventionally measured primary sur-
pluses. The Latin American countries averaged primary surpluses of 1.3
percent versus -0.1 percent in the earlier periods. African countries had
deficits of -1.6 percent from 1990-2003, but this was a considerable
improvement over -3.4 percent from the pre-1990 period.
There are, of course, notable examples of countries where inflation
has been coming down despite rising deficits and debt ratios. India has
been recording general government deficits of roughly 10 percent of
GDP for almost half a dozen years now, yet inflation has declined.
Recession-ridden, post-1980s-bubble Japan, with sustained deficits of
6-7 percent of GDP and a debt/GDP ratio exceeding 150 percent, is
actually experiencing deflation. More generally, Reinhart, Rogoff, and
Savastano (2003) document that many emerging-market and develop-
ing-country economies have seen a substantial buildup in market-based
debt over the past 15 years.17 Financial liberalization, (for example,
paying market interest on debt formerly forced on banks at sub-market
Table 5
GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCES
(Fiscal balances as a percent of GDP)
Region Primary Overall
1970–89 1990–2002 1970–89 1990–2002
Industrial economies -.11 2.76 -2.5 -2.53
Developing countries:
Africa -3.58 -1.63 -6.45 -4.99
Asia -1.29 -1.2 -3.91 -3.56
Latin America -.13 1.25 -4.58 -2.7
Middle East 2.53 -.96 -7.57 -4.48
Transition economies .23 -1.94 -.18 -4.33
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
interest), lower tariff revenue, and, in some cases, higher government
budget deficits, are some of the factors behind this trend. Yet most of
these economies have succeeded in lowering inflation.
Also, whereas many industrialized countries experienced an improve-
ment in their debt/GDP ratios during the 1990s, up until the 2001
recession, few countries made significant net forward progress on dealing
with their retirement bulge, which has been creeping ever closer. For
many countries, the imputed long-term fiscal effects of bringing the
demographic shock one step closer each year is quantitatively a more
serious problem than the typical year’s budget deficit. On net, then, fiscal
policy is likely to have been broadly supportive of the disinflation process,
but outside of a couple of developing country regions (most notably parts
of Latin American and Africa), fiscal policy cannot be considered a uni-
versal and decisive factor in the broad global disinflation we have
documented in the first section.
Chart 6
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1971-2001
Five-year moving average; output per hour
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Productivity growth and the Technological Revolution
Another plausible factor that might have helped support disinflation
is productivity growth. Unexpected productivity growth at least tem-
porarily reduces the pressure on the central bank to inflate, both because
growth strengthens fiscal positions and because any short-term tradeoffs
between disinflation and growth become more politically palatable. True,
the productivity story works well for the United States since the latter half
of the 1990s.18 In its simplest form, though, the productivity hypothesis
falls far short as an explanation for global disinflation. In the case of
Europe, for instance, the simple correlation goes the wrong way; inflation
was falling through most of the period, while trend productivity growth
was declining as well. Indeed, as Chart 6 highlights, productivity growth
slowed substantially in the second half of the 1990s, continuing the trend
decline among the largest European economies. In the developing world,
productivity—especially in traded goods—probably has been a factor in
many cases. It is hard, though, to separate its impact from that of global-
ization, to which we will turn to next.
Globalization, deregulation, and declining monopoly power
While, admittedly, hard evidence is still limited, the mutually rein-
forcing effects of globalization, deregulation, and widespread reduction
of the role of government have no doubt sharply increased competition
and lowered “quasi-rents” to monopolistic firms and unions throughout
much of the world. Blanchard and Philippon (2003), drawing on
results from a broader OECD study of deregulation (Nicoletti and
others 2000, 2001), argue that quasi-rents in the OECD have fallen
steadily since the 1970s. In that case, goods and capital market integra-
tion in Europe provided an important initial impulse. Production then
was shifting to lower cost countries, just as today production is shifting
toward the EU accession countries of central Europe.
During the 1980s, the speed of deregulation increased markedly in
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. It eventu-
ally brought these countries to levels close to that of the United States,
where deregulation had begun a decade earlier. Continental Europe fol-
lowed the deregulation bandwagon of the Anglophone countries,64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
making significant progress in the 1990s. Still, this region has retained
higher regulatory barriers and barriers to entrepreneurship (Nicoletti
and others 2000, 2001). Markups of price over marginal cost—a stan-
dard measure of monopoly rents—remain much higher on the
continent compared to the United Kingdom and the United States
(about 0.40 versus 0.15, according to estimates used in the IMF’s April
2003 World Economic Outlook). In developing countries, opening to
trade has typically led to sharp drops in monopoly rents for domestic
firms (often the strongest opponents of trade). Though far from always
the case—especially where countries failed to put needed regulation in
place—widespread privatization has increased competition as well.
A reduction in monopoly pricing power per force leads to lower real
prices, holding monetary policy constant. Monetary authorities can, of
course, suitably adjust monetary policy to offset such nominal price
level effects. As I elaborate below, however, they will choose in general
to let some of the effects pass on to lower inflation.
Of course, in parallel with the indirect effects stressed above, glob-
alization can also have a direct impact on prices. Trade with emerging
Asia has certainly put downward pressure on the real cost of goods;
workers in most countries can now buy more with a given income than
prior to globalization.19 Although China alone accounts for 5 percent
of world trade, emerging Asia combined accounts for almost 20
percent. The simultaneous workings of direct and indirect effects make
it difficult to assess accurately the quantitative impact of emerging Asia’s
growing trade on global prices. For example, even though traded goods
constitute at most 20-25 percent of the U.S. GDP (Obstfeld and
Rogoff 2000), sharp reductions in their prices are bound to create
spillover effects on other sectors. Many of the traded goods are interme-
diate goods (such as computers), or, to some degree, substitutes for
nontraded goods.
Does it matter if trade and deregulation increase competition and
push down real prices? Isn’t, after all, inflation about nominal price levels
not real price levels? How can globalization lead to disinflation in coun-
tries where the central bank is not firmly committed to an exchange rate
target and free to aim for its own domestic inflation target?ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 65
Increased competition and anti-inflation credibility
In recent years, a number of authors have pointed out that modern
new Keynesian and New Open Economy macroeconomic models,
where monopolistic competition is typically a crucial feature, can be
used to provide micro foundations to the classic Kydland-Prescott-Barro-
Gordon model of credibility and monetary policy. In this new analytical
framework, monopoly in both the product and labor markets creates a
wedge between the monopoly level of employment and the correspon-
ding benchmark competitive level. Such an imperfection provides the
crucial motivation for the central bank to inflate in order to drive
employment above its “natural” market determined rate. As the wedge
becomes smaller, there is less to gain from unanticipated inflation. Central
bank anti-inflation credibility is enhanced, even without any institutional
change. As a consequence, average equilibrium inflation falls.20 Thus, an
increased level of competition in the economy—due either to globaliza-
tion or deregulation—not only lowers the real prices of goods, but also
tips coordination toward a lower inflation equilibrium.
A second closely related causal mechanism works from greater com-
petitiveness to lower inflation through higher price flexibility.
According to a large theoretical and empirical literature in very compet-
itive sectors, like agriculture or semi-conductors, prices are significantly
more flexible than in sectors that are highly unionized or have a small
numbers of industries.21 Where prices are more flexible, the impact of
monetary policy on the real economy becomes less potent. In turn,
then, the lower gains from unanticipated inflation make the commit-
ment of the monetary authorities to low inflation more credible.
Certainly, many other factors affect the credibility of anti-inflation-
ary policy across countries, including debts and deficits, as we have
already discussed above. And as noted in the introduction, my desire to
isolate and formalize the effects of globalization on inflation leads
perhaps to a narrower portrayal of the effect than is likely the case.
Other channels outside the model, such as dollarization, are almost
surely also significant.2266 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In sum, globalization, acting in synergy with deregulation and pri-
vatization, puts downward pressure on real prices and weakens the
incentives that central banks may have to produce unanticipated infla-
tion; thereby, it also leads to lower nominal price inflation over the
long run.
A simple mathematical formalization of the effects of increased
competition on equilibrium trend inflation
Though many readers will be quite familiar with the Barro-Gordon
model of inflation, a limited mathematical digression might neverthe-
less be useful. Assume a very simple world in which the central bank
directly sets the inflation rate, π. The private sector makes decisions—
including setting nominal wage and price contracts that embody
expectations, πe, about what the central bank will do. Output, in turn,
is an increasing function of π - πe. The private sector guesses right about
inflation on average, despite the fact there is a wedge, k, between the
socially optimal rate of output and the market-determined rate of
output. In the original Barro-Gordon formulation, the authors
appealed to income taxation as one factor that might create such a
wedge, but newer formulations that derive the whole setting from
micro foundations stress that this wedge is inversely proportional to the
degree of monopoly power in the economy. Overall, in the simplest
static formulations, and ignoring institutions and credibility (the
subject of much literature), the central banks’ objective function is
given by
(π - πe – k - z)2 + χ(π – π*)2,
where the first term is meant to capture the central banks’ desire to stabi-
lize output around its natural rate (assumed proportional to π- πe – k- z);
and where z is mean zero productivity shock, π* is the central banks’ pre-
ferred rate of inflation (say 2.5 percent), and χ is the weight (priority) it
puts on inflation stabilization versus output stabilization. As is well
known, if private agents are rational and understand the central banks
objectives, then the expected inflation rate will be
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The actual inflation rate the central bank will select is 
π = π* + (k - z)/χ.
Since the productivity shock is zero on average, private sector
agents are right on average about the inflation rate. Without going into
further details—since there are many places to find related analyses (for
example, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, chapter 9)—this short analysis
allows me to reinforce a couple points. First, when globalization and
deregulation make the economy more competitive, they reduce the
wedge k, causing expected inflation to fall permanently. The decline in
inflation here is not caused by the fact that monopoly prices are higher
than competitive prices, as usually discussed in the popular press. The
relative price effect need not have any effect on inflation unless the
central bank chooses so. Rather, the smaller wedge systematically lowers
the central bank’s incentives to inflate, so that it will, on average, choose
a smaller π. A positive productivity shock has only a temporary impact
on inflation and no effect in the long run, unless it affects the wedge k.
Potentially, a large enough positive productivity shock can even throw
an economy into deflation if target inflation π* is too low. (In a richer
model, a demand shock could produce a similar result.)
Indeed, the new breed of micro-founded models suggests that
reduced monopoly will have a further effect—arguably, more important
and universal than the one we have already stressed. If greater competi-
tion makes prices more flexible, then one can reformulate the central
bank’s objective function as
[µ(π - πe) – k – z]2 + χ(π – π*)2,
where µ is inversely proportional to the degree of price flexibility in the
economy. Equilibrium expected and actual inflation are now given by
πe = π* + µ k/ χ and π = π* + µ (k - z)/ χ.68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
A higher µ reflects a greater proportion of inflexibly priced goods in
the economy and a greater temptation to inflate. In such a setting, since
an increase in competitiveness also decreases µ in addition to k, the argu-
ment that greater competitiveness makes anti-inflation policy more
credible is strengthened. 
The basic point made here generalizes to virtually all variants of the
Barro-Gordon model. In principle, it may be generalized to more
dynamic models as well, as long as imperfect monetary policy credibil-
ity remains an issue, as I, for one, believe it will always be.
Hopefully, this short mathematical detour has clarified some of the
basic points made earlier:
(1) In thinking about trend inflation, what really matters is the
central bank’s incentives to inflate. Shocks to relative prices,
which many confuse with inflation, are of secondary importance.
(2) Unexpected productivity (technology) shocks can lower infla-
tion, but only temporarily. An explanation of the deeper trend
must lie elsewhere, in factors such as greater competition or
price flexibility.
Reduced conflict
Though the modern era has witnessed a number of peacetime infla-
tions, it is war or civil conflict that has caused many of history’s
high-inflation episodes. We already see this in Chart 3 for the G-7 coun-
tries. Inflation spikes during World War II and its aftermath, and then
again in the 1970s, sparked at least in part by Vietnam-era U.S. budget
deficits. If the data were extended back to World War I, the effect would
be even more dramatic. Many of today’s few remaining high-inflation
countries labor under a legacy of conflict; if new very high-inflation cases
appear over the next year or two, conflict is likely to be one of the major
reasons behind them. Though the 1990s witnessed many terrible wars,
the overall situation was milder than in previous decades, especially for
the larger economies. Of course, the post September 11 era has seen
some rollback of the peace dividend of the 1990s.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 69
III. WILL INFLATION COME BACK?
The huge success of monetary authorities around the globe in
reducing inflation over the past decade owes much to more effective
and independent central banking institutions, as well as to a generation
of policymakers determined to establish and maintain low inflation.
But the task has been made easier by a number of supporting factors,
including relatively low debt accumulation, technological advances,
deregulation, a reduced role of government in the economy, and,
perhaps most important, globalization. It is clear that the relative role of
these diverse supporting factors has differed across countries, but overall
the global environment has been favorable. One central point of this
paper is that increased competition in an economy not only has a one-
off effect on relative prices, but through the political economy of the
inflation process can lead to a sustained reduction in inflation rates.
Can inflation, which has been largely eradicated in the industrial-
ized countries and is now being tamed if not exterminated in one
developing country after another, make a comeback in the next decade
or two? Though institutions and understanding are much improved, it
is not hard to imagine that the present historical wave of low inflation,
like others, will someday end.
For example, I have argued that globalization and deregulation have
been powerful forces supporting the political economy of low inflation.
These engines of higher competition and productivity will most likely
continue to strengthen in coming decades, but long reversals are possi-
ble. After all, globalization was a dominant theme in development in the
19th century, too, but the process came to an abrupt halt and was even
reversed for the four decades following the outbreak of World War I. As
already noted, conflict has the potential to interfere with globalization in
the modern era. An admittedly melodramatic example illustrates the
point: If terrorist threats ever reach the point where ships entering, say,
the United States, ever need to be searched and scanned like passengers
in an airport, the resulting delays and frictions would deal a blow to the
complex global supply chain, with both one-off and dynamic effects. If
events forced sharp cutbacks in global trade for a sustained period,
domestic political and economic dynamics would likely allow firms and70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
unions to recover part of their monopoly power; one could envision then
circumstances of greater price inflexibility with greater pressures on the
central banks to inflate.
Also, while there are few countries today where fiscal policy is an
immediate threat to monetary policy, it is not hard to find industrial-
ized or emerging-market countries where debt levels are a looming
problem. Countries facing immediate adverse demographic shocks are
particularly at risk. Although old age retirement payments are indexed
to inflation in most countries, some governments may still find that the
easiest way to back out of unsustainable systems is via some combina-
tion of “surprise” de-indexing and inflation.
The greatest threat to today’s low inflation, of course, would be a
reversal of the modern trend toward enhanced central bank independ-
ence, particularly if trend economic growth were to slow, owing, say, to
a retreat in globalization and economic liberalization. The favorable
economic climate is also supportive of a favorable political climate. As
long as central bank independence remains strong, and it is widely
accepted that low inflation should be one of the central bank’s main
aims, today’s virtual zero inflation can potentially be maintained for a
long time. Still, overall, one must acknowledge that any pronounced or
widespread relapses in the relatively favorable backdrop of globalization,
deregulation, productivity increase, and relatively benign fiscal policies
could begin to roll back the extraordinary achievement of recent years.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 71
Appendix Table 1
INFLATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1970–2003
1
(Percent per annum)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03
1 Albania 0 0 44.4 2.9
2 Algeria 8.2 9.0 17.8 2.5
3 Angola 40.1 6.3 1011.0 165.5
4 Antigua and Barbuda 12.5 5.7 3.4 .9
5 Argentina 132.9 565.7 252.9 11.5
6 Armenia .3 1.2 1015.4 1.4
7 Australia 9.6 8.1 2.5 3.6
8 Austria 6.1 3.8 2.1 1.9
9 Azerbaijan .3 1.2 424.6 2.2
10 Bahamas, The 6.9 6.3 2.8 1.7
11 Bahrain, Kingdom of 12.5 2.2 .9 -1.1
12 Bangladesh 20.2 11.3 6.7 3.1
13 Barbados 14.0 7.3 2.9 1.4
14 Belarus .3 1.1 568.2 75.2
15 Belgium 7.1 4.9 2.1 2.0
16 Belize 17.2 4.6 -1.7 .5
17 Benin 3.5 2.3 7.7 3.2
18 Bhutan 3.6 9.2 9.7 4.1
19 Bolivia 15.9 1383.1 10.4 2.4
20 Bosnia & Herzegovina n/a n/a n/a 2.3
21 Botswana 9.6 13.1 10.9 6.3
22 Brazil 30.6 332.3 854.8 9.1
23 Brunei Darussalam n/a n/a 2.1 .2
24 Bulgaria 0 2.6 187.6 6.7
25 Burkina Faso 8.1 3.5 4.5 2.6
26 Burundi 10.7 7.0 13.8 9.8
27 Cambodia 7.5 9.0 57.3 1.6
28 Cameroon 10.7 7.8 5.2 2.9
29 Canada 7.4 6.5 2.2 2.6
30 Cape Verde 10.7 11.6 7.3 1.4
31 Central African Rep. 13.3 6.1 3.9 3.6
32 Chad 8.0 5.1 4.9 6.2
33 Chile 162.0 21.4 11.8 3.3
34 China, P.R.: Mainland 1.2 7.5 7.8 .1
35 China, P.R.: Hong Kong 7.9 7.5 6.9 -2.5
36 Colombia 19.8 23.4 22.2 7.3
37 Comoros 11.2 5.5 3.9 1.6
38 Congo, Dem. Rep. of 40.1 59.5 3369.0 236.4
39 Congo, Republic of 8.1 .4 8.2 1.6
40 Costa Rica 8.5 25.9 17.7 10.3
41 Côte d'Ivoire 13.0 5.9 5.9 3.6
42 Croatia 16.7 191.4 299.9 4.4
43 Cyprus 6.8 5.8 3.9 3.3
44 Czech Republic .6 1.5 14.7 2.9
1Consumer price inflation72 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Appendix Table 1 (cont.)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-03
45 Denmark 9.3 6.9 2.1 2.5
46 Djibouti 12.3 5.1 4.4 1.9
47 Dominica 13.3 7.7 2.3 0.7
48 Dominican Republic 9.2 21.4 15.3 9.1
49 Ecuador n/a -1.7 2.3 12.5
50 Egypt 7.7 17.4 10.9 2.7
51 El Salvador 9.1 18.6 10.4 2.7
52 Equatorial Guinea 10.4 21.7 7.5 8.6
53 Eritrea n/a n/a n/a 19.3
54 Estonia 0.3 1.2 151.6 4.4
55 Ethiopia 10.6 5.2 7.4 -1.4
56 Euro Area n/a n/a n/a 2.3
57 Fiji 9.1 7.5 4.2 2.3
58 Finland 10.4 7.3 2.1 2.5
59 France 8.9 7.3 1.9 1.9
60 Gabon 11.1 6.4 5.5 1.2
61 Gambia, The 9.9 17.2 5.8 4.6
62 Georgia 0.3 1.2 1993.3 4.8
63 Germany 4.9 2.9 2.4 1.7
64 Ghana 38.8 48.3 27.6 21.1
65 Greece 7.1 12.3 11.0 3.6
66 Grenada 18.7 7.1 2.3 1.9
67 Guatemala 8.8 10.5 15.3 6.3
68 Guinea 6.3 33.7 8.7 4.6
69 Guinea-Bissau 9.3 61.1 37.5 4.5
70 Guyana 9.2 27.9 25.3 4.4
71 Haiti 8.9 7.7 20.6 11.6
72 Honduras 6.6 7.6 19.7 9.2
73 Hungary 3.8 8.9 22.2 7.4
74 Iceland 29.7 39.3 4.2 4.7
75 India 7.4 9.1 9.5 4.0
76 Indonesia 17.5 9.7 14.5 9.0
77 Iran, I.R. of 11.2 19.8 14.2 14.1
78 Ireland 12.8 9.3 2.4 4.6
79 Israel 32.5 129.7 11.2 2.7
80 Italy 12.5 11.4 4.2 2.6
81 Jamaica 16.5 17.2 27.5 7.3
82 Japan 9.1 2.5 1.2 -.8
83 Jordan 10.8 7.0 3.1 1.7
84 Kazakhstan .3 1.2 540.3 8.5
85 Kenya 11.0 11.5 16.9 5.6
86 Kiribati 7.5 4.6 3.4 3.5
87 Korea 15.2 8.4 5.7 3.2
88 Kuwait 8.2 3.6 9.7 1.9
89 Kyrgyz Republic 0.3 1.2 204.7 7.9
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91 Latvia .3 1.5 127.7 2.5
92 Lebanon 12.6 96.6 30.4 .8
93 Lesotho 14.2 14.2 11.1 8.5
94 Liberia 8.8 7.5 10.0 10.0
95 Libya 5.5 8.9 7.0 -1.8
96 Lithuania .3 1.3 120.7 1.2
97 Luxembourg 7.0 4.7 2.2 2.5
98 Macedonia, FYR 16.7 191.4 294.6 4.2
99 Madagascar 7.9 18.6 17.3 6.2
100 Malawi 9.0 17.0 30.5 19.0
101 Malaysia 5.5 3.6 3.7 1.8
102 Maldives 10.8 7.4 7.7 1.0
103 Mali 13.8 4.2 4.2 3.6
104 Malta 5.6 3.6 2.9 2.4
105 Mauritania 9.9 8.4 6.2 4.0
106 Mauritius 10.5 11.6 7.8 5.4
107 Mexico 14.7 69.1 20.4 6.3
108 Moldova .3 1.2 267.4 12.7
109 Mongolia 0 .2 73.6 6.2
110 Morocco 7.8 7.6 4.5 1.8
111 Mozambique 2.0 41.8 33.6 11.8
112 Myanmar 11.1 10.4 27.2 29.9
113 Namibia 10.6 13.1 10.3 9.8
114 Nepal 8.3 8.4 10.2 3.2
115 Netherlands 7.1 2.8 2.3 3.5
116 Netherlands Antilles 8.3 4.9 2.4 1.9
117 New Zealand 11.5 11.9 2.4 2.5
118 Nicaragua 22.3 2098.8 1100.8 6.3
119 Niger 10.6 4.1 5.0 2.5
120 Nigeria 15.7 20.7 31.8 13.5
121 Norway 8.4 6.1 2.4 2.6
122 Oman 6.7 1.9 1.5 -.1
123 Pakistan 12.0 7.3 9.7 3.6
124 Panama 6.0 3.1 1.1 .9
125 Papua New Guinea 7.6 6.3 8.7 9.5
126 Paraguay 11.1 20.5 16.5 11.5
127 Peru 26.5 481.5 808.3 2.1
128 Philippines 15.2 14.5 9.5 4.4
129 Poland 8.0 59.9 84.8 4.7
130 Portugal 7.1 16.4 5.9 3.5
131 Qatar 17.6 4.0 2.9 1.9
132 Romania .8 3.0 122.3 29.7
133 Russia .3 2.5 339.2 17.7
134 Rwanda 12.4 4.7 17.3 3.1
135 Samoa 9.4 9.7 4.1 4.174 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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136 São Tomé & Príncipe 10.8 14.8 40.5 9.4
137 Saudi Arabia 13.7 .1 .9 -.2
138 Senegal 9.8 6.9 4.2 2.0
139 Serbia and Montenegro n/a n/a n/a 48.9
140 Seychelles 16.6 4.0 2.1 6.1
141 Sierra Leone 10.8 62.9 45.9 .6
142 Singapore 5.9 2.8 1.9 .7
143 Slovak Republic .6 1.5 15.7 7.9
144 Slovenia 16.7 191.4 100.8 7.6
145 Solomon Islands 8.2 11.8 10.7 7.6
146 South Africa 10.6 14.7 9.9 7.4
147 Spain 14.1 10.2 4.2 3.3
148 Sri Lanka 6.6 12.8 11.3 8.9
149 St. Kitts and Nevis 18.0 4.8 3.5 2.0
150 St. Lucia 13.4 5.6 3.2 2.7
151 St. Vincent & Grens. 8.6 5.5 3.2 .6
152 Sudan 15.7 40.2 80.4 6.0
153 Suriname 8.7 12.9 97.7 33.4
154 Swaziland 10.1 15.0 9.5 9.8
155 Sweden 8.6 7.9 3.6 2.2
156 Switzerland 5.0 3.3 2.3 1.0
157 Syrian Arab Republic 8.9 23.7 7.6 1.0
158 Taiwan Prov. of China 9.5 4.2 2.9 .3
159 Tajikistan .3 1.2 500.6 23.3
160 Tanzania 11.6 30.5 22.4 5.1
161 Thailand 8.0 5.8 5.0 1.4
162 Togo 9.6 4.6 7.3 3.4
163 Tonga 4.4 9.3 4.4 4.7
164 Trinidad and Tobago 11.6 11.9 6.0 3.8
165 Tunisia 5.2 8.7 4.9 2.8
166 Turkey 24.0 51.3 78.0 44.8
167 Turkmenistan .3 1.2 757.2 10.4
168 Uganda 74.4 122.3 17.2 2.4
169 Ukraine .3 1.7 743.7 11.5
170 United Arab Emirates 20.0 5.1 3.6 2.3
171 United Kingdom 12.4 7.1 3.8 2.3
172 United States 7.1 5.5 3.0 2.5
173 Uruguay 60.5 57.4 49.1 12.8
174 Uzbekistan .3 1.1 335.2 39.9
175 Vanuatu 6.8 9.0 3.3 3.1
176 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 6.6 23.1 47.4 22.2
177 Vietnam 4.8 168.0 21.1 1.4
178 Yemen, Republic of 22.4 15.1 38.9 11.0
179 Zambia 10.3 40.0 76.5 22.1
180 Zimbabwe 7.0 5.5 28.5 180.6
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ENDNOTES
1These figures are from the 2003 and 2004 average global inflation projec-
tions from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. Country inflation rates are
weighted by PPP GDP weights (WEO).
2 See Reinhart and Rogoff 2002.
3 See Bruno and Easterly 1995.
4 See Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003.
5 In 1987, before most of the transition countries began to exit communism,
24 countries had inflation over 40 percent—far over 40 percent in many cases.
6 In 2002, Angola, Belarus, Iraq, Myanmar, Turkey, and Zimbabwe were the
countries with over 40 percent inflation.
7 Chart 1 is based on Kumar and others 2003.
8 See for example Evans 1991, Brunner and Hess 1993, and Darrat,
Franklin, and Lopez 1988.
9 A small number of other studies have looked at the time series evidence on
whether inflation has become more stable in industrialized countries, including
Pivetta and Reis 2003, Batini 2002, and Levin and Piger 2003.
10 Romer and Romer 1996, Blinder 1998.
11 It is easy to forget that the leading monetary theorists of the 1980s were
ever so sure that their theories proved that any attempt at discretion in monetary
policy would prove counterproductive—a dogma that has now been roundly
rejected even by their most fanatic followers.
12 The low rate of turnover may not be a perfect proxy for central bank of
independence—turnover of the membership of the central bank’s policymaking
committee is equally important—but it nevertheless appears to track the degree
of continuity and independence reasonably well. 
13 The underlying data used to construct Table 4 are drawn from Ghosh,
Gulde, and Wolfe 2003, and are also used by Tytell and Wei 2003.
14 An exception for transition countries where, evidently, there was relatively
less turnover under communism!
15 Ball and Sheridan (2003) argue that inflation targeters have not necessarily
reformed better than other central banks, either in achieving low inflation or achiev-
ing macroeconomic stability, with the supposed superior performance of inflation
targeters deriving mainly from those countries with very weak starting points.
16 That pegged exchange rate regimes should perform relatively well in stabi-
lizing inflation for developing countries should come as no surprise, especially
since, in the construction of Chart 5, high inflation after the collapse of a peg is
attributed to the post-peg regime.
17 See also chapter III of the September 2003 World Economic Outlook
(IMF 2003b), that extends the analysis of Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003).
18 See, for instance, DeLong 2002.
19 In passing, it is worth mentioning that global commodity prices were on a
steady downward trend for much of the period since the 1990s, again providing a
favorable environment for price reduction in commodity importing countries.
Arguably, this factor may be more important than I am giving it credit here and
bears further consideration.
20 See Obstfeld and Rogoff, chapter 10, for example, or Ireland 1996.76 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
21 See Taylor and Woodford 1999.
22 For example, globalization and increased openness also harden a central
banks’ anti-inflationary resolve through a third, interrelated channel. In theory, at
least, an unanticipated monetary expansion would tend to depreciate the exchange
rate. Such a depreciation would imply that a given level of monetary stimulus
affects inflation more and employment (due to wage indexation and higher costs
of intermediate goods) the more open the economy is. Openness, in other words,
tempers the incentives of monetary authorities to inflate. (See Rogoff 1985 and
Romer 1992; the latter provides cross-country empirical evidence).ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 77
REFERENCES
Ball, L., and N. Sheridan. 2003. “Does Inflation Targeting Matter?” IMF working
paper 03/129, Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Batini, N. 2002. “Euro Area Inflation Persistence,” European Central Bank work-
ing paper, no. 201, December.
Berger, Helge, S. Eijffinger, and J. de Haan. 2001. “Central Bank Independence: An
Update of Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15, no. 1,
pp. 3-40.
Blanchard, O., and T. Philippon. (2003). “The Decline of Rents and the Rise and
Fall of European Unemployment,” mimeo MIT. 
Blinder, A. S. 1998. Central Banking in Theory and Practice, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: MIT Press, 1998.
Bruno, M., and W. Easterly. 1995. “Inflation Crises and Long-Run Growth,”
Cambridge, Massachusetts: NBER working paper no. 5209.
Brunner, A. D., G.D. Hess. 1993. “Are Higher Levels of Inflation Less Pre-
dictable? A State-Dependent Conditional Heteroscedasticity Approach,”
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol. 11, no. 2 (April ), pp. 187-97.
Darrat, Ali F., Franklin A. Lopez. 1988. “Price Instability and Inflation: Some Tests
Based on Rational Expectations Models,” Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 2, 
pp. 111-19
DeLong, J. Bradford. 2002. Productivity and Growth in the 2000s, in Mark
Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, MIT
Press, 2003
Evans, M. 1991. “Discovering the Link Between Inflation Rates and Inflation
Uncertainty,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (U.S.), vol. 23, pp. 169-
84. May 1991.
Ghosh, A. R., A. Gulde, and H. C. Wolfe. 2003. Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices
and Consequences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
International Monetary Fund. 2003a. World Economic Outlook, April 2003.
____________. 2003b. World Economic Outlook, September 2003.
Ireland, P. 1996. “The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 104, 4, pp. 704-723.  
Kumar, M. S., T. Baig, J. Decressin, C. Faulkner-MacDonagh, and T. Feyzio˘ glu,
2003, Deflation Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options, IMF occasional paper
no. 221, Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Levin, A.T., and J. Piger. 2003. “Is Inflation Persistence Intrinsic in Industrial
Countries,” mimeo, Federal Reserve Board.
Logue, D., and T. Willett. 1976. “A Note on the Relation between the Rate and
Variability of Inflation,” Economica, no. 43 (May), pp. 151–158.
Nicolleti, G., Bassanini, A., E. Ernst, S. Jean, P. Santiago, and P Swaim. 2001.
“Product and Labor Market Interactions in OECD Countries,” OECD Eco-
nomics Department working paper 312.
Nicolleti, G., Scarpetta, S., and O. Boylaud. 2000. “Summary Indicators of Prod-
uct Market Regulation with and Extension to Employment Protection Legis-
lation,” OECD, Economics Department working paper 226.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2002. Economic Outlook. 78 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff. 1996. Foundations of International Macroeconomics,
MIT Press.
_________, and _________. 2000. “The Six Major Puzzles in International
Finance: Is there a Common Cause?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15.
Okun, A. 1971. “The Mirage of Steady Inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 2, pp. 485-98.
Pivetta, F., and R. Reis. 2003. “The Persistence of Inflation in the United States,”
mimeo, Harvard University.
Ragan, C. 1994. “A Framework for Examining the Real Effects of Inflation Volatil-
ity,” in Proceedings of a Conference on Economic Behavior and Policy Choice
Under Price Stability (Bank of Canada, October 1993).
Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff. 2004. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate
Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (forth-
coming).
_________, and _________. 2002. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate
Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,” NBER working paper 8963.
Reinhart, C., K. Rogoff, and M. Savastano. 2003. "Debt Intolerance" (with Car-
men M. Reinhart and Miguel A. Savastano), in William Brainard and George
Perry (eds.), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1: 2003, pp. 1-74.
Rogoff, K. 1985. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Mon-
etary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (November,) pp. 1169-89. 
_________. 1985. “Can International Monetary Cooperation be Counterproduc-
tive?” Journal of International Economics (18) pp. 199-217.
Romer, D. 1993. “Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 108, November.  
Romer, C., and D. H. Romer. 1997. “Institutions for Monetary Stability,” in C.
Romer and D. Romer eds., Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.  
Sebastian, J., and G. Nicoletti. 2002. “Product Market Regulation and Wage Pre-
mia in Europe and North America,” OECD Economics Department work-
ing paper ECO/WKP (2002)4. 
Taylor J.B., and M. Woodford. eds., 1999. Handbook of Macroeconomics, North
Holland.
Tytell, I., and S.J. Wei. 2003. “Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macro-
economic Policies?” IMF working paper, forthcoming.